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Abstract
This paper examines the conduct of monetary policy in the presence
of credit and asset booms and busts. Conventional wisdom is for the
central bank to respond to asset prices and other nancial indicators in-
sofar as these factors a¤ect the forecasts of ination. This paper nds
that such strategy is far from being optimal. This paper derives opti-
mal policy under commitment in a standard nancial accelerator model
and nds that in the optimal equilibrium, the central bank responds to a
rise in productivity growth by making a credible commitment to keep the
rate of return on capital below the trend. This causes net worth to be
countercyclical, which is the key mechanism that allows the central bank
to successfully stabilize the economy. The countercyclicality of net worth
is consistent with what can be found in the data on the periods following
the Volcker chairmanship of the FOMC.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, one interesting economic trend has emerged. It
appears that global nancial markets are increasingly subject to credit, invest-
ment and asset-price booms and busts.1 Such a phenomenon is associated with
a sharp surge in credit and investment in the upturn of the cycle, due to among
other things an excessive rise in productivity growth. This in turn leads to a
boom in equity prices and real-estate markets. Then, some disruptive incidents
trigger the bust phase of the cycle, resulting in a sudden drying-up of liquidity
and a sharp fall in asset prices, which for many cases culminating into a banking
or a currency crisis.
A case in point is the sharp surge in credit to the real estate sector, that led
to the US savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. A similar chain of events occurred
in Japan in the late 1980s, that resulted in the lost decades, the periods of
economic stagnation characterized by strings of recession and deation. A boom
in credit and an excessive rise in asset prices were also observed prior to the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98. Most recently, the world witnessed equity-
price bubbles in the NASDAQ, which were associated with heavy investment in
information technology and telecommunications, only to end up with the stock
market collapse in 2002.
This raises a question on how central banks should conduct monetary policy
amid credit and asset booms and busts. One prominent approach, dubbed by
Bordo and Jeanne (2002b) as Benign Neglectis for central banks to respond to
asset prices and other nancial factors insofar as these factors a¤ect the forecasts
of ination. Under this notion, several authors suggest that an appropriate
monetary-policy strategy is to set short-term interest rates to respond strongly
to ination [See Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)
and Gilchrist and Saito (2006)].2
The question is whether such a strategy is desirable from the standpoint of
an ination-targeting central bank whose objective is to maintain price stability
and full employment. The earlier literature did not give a denite answer
to this. It should be noted that to evaluate the monetary policy strategy of
responding strongly to ination, the earlier literature compares the performance
of such strategy with those of a narrowly-dened set of Taylor-type interest rate
rules. In particular, the earlier literature nds that the policy strategy to
respond strongly to ination leads to a better macroeconomic outcome than,
for instance, a rule that responds weakly to ination and a rule that responds
to asset prices. But this does not necessarily mean that the policy strategy to
respond strongly to ination is optimal.
The present paper attempts to examine whether it is optimal for central
banks to follow the policy strategy of responding strongly to ination. As a
contribution, the present paper is the rst paper that derives optimal policy
1See for instance Bordo and Jeanne (2002a) and White (2006).
2To respond strongly to ination means that the extent to which the central bank raises
the nominal interest rate is much larger than the increase in ination. See section 3 for a
more precise denition and how to model this strategy analytically.
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under commitment in a standard nancial accelerator model with endogenous
capital accumulation and credit-market frictions.3 The paper evaluates the per-
formance of the policy strategy of responding strongly to ination and compares
it with macroeconomic outcomes under optimal policy.
The paper nds that the monetary policy strategy of responding strongly
to ination is far from being optimal. Under such a strategy, the economy
is subject to credit and asset boom-bust cycles, in which following a rise in
productivity growth, there is a run-up in credit. This leads to a sharp increase
in investment and asset prices, which causes rms to take on more credit. The
excessive growth rate of capital accumulation causes the economy to overheat,
thereby resulting in inationary pressures.
On the other hand, following optimal policy under commitment, the central
bank is able to successfully stabilize ination and the output gap while avoid-
ing the vicious cycle of credit and asset booms and busts. The paper nds
that under optimal policy the central bank responds to an unexpected rise in
productivity growth by making a credible commitment to maintain the tight-
ening bias and thus to keep the return on capital below the trend. This causes
net worth to be countercyclical, which is the reason why the central bank can
successfully sever the link between the distortions in the nancial markets and
those in the real sector. The countercyclicality of net worth under optimal
policy is also consistent with the empirical evidence in the periods following the
Volcker chairmanship of the FOMC, in which the economy has become much
less volatile.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 sets
up the model used for the analysis. Section 3 presents the policy problem of a
central bank who can commit, and provides an algorithm for computing optimal
policy under commitment. The stabilization performance of optimal policy
under commitment and macroeconomic outcomes under the policy strategy of
responding strongly to ination are examined in section 4. Section 5 investigates
some alternative monetary policy rules that are often used in the literature.
Section 6 provides empirical evidence that the countercyclicality of net worth
in the optimal equilibrium is consistent with what can be found in the data.
Section 7 explains an intuition on why net worth is countercyclical in the optimal
equilibrium. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model economy
The model used in the analysis is the one presented in Gilchrist and Saito (2006)
[henceforth, GS]. The GS model is essentially a standard New Keynesian model
augmented to include credit-market frictions through the nancial accelerator
mechanism described in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [henceforth,
BGG]. The model consists of six sectors: households, entrepreneurs, retailers,
3Faia and Monacelli (2006) use social welfare evaluation but, in their analysis, the central
bank is restricted to set the nominal interest rate according to a class of Taylor-type instrument
rules.
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capital producers, the government and the central bank. Households consume,
hold money, save in one-period riskless bonds and supply labor to entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs manage the production of wholesale goods, which requires capital
constructed by capital producers and labor supplied by both households and
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs purchase capital and nance the expenditures
of capital with their net worth and debt. Entrepreneurs sell wholesale goods
to monopolistically competitive retailers who di¤erentiate the product slightly
at zero resource cost. Each retailer then sets price and sells its di¤erentiated
product to households, capital producers, entrepreneurs and the government.
Rather than work through the details of the derivation, which are readily
available in GS, I instead directly introduce the log-linearized version of the
aggregate relationships of the model.
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables in the model. Throughout,
steady-state levels of the variables are in lower case without time subscripts
while log-deviations from the steady-state are in lower case with time subscripts.
The corresponding hypothetical levels of the variables in the frictionless econ-
omy are denoted by a star. Greek letters and lower case Roman letters without
subscripts denote xed parameters. Table 2 provides a summary of the para-
meters as well as their baseline calibration.
The rst equation is the log-linearized version of the national income identity:
yt =
c
y
ct +
inv
y
invt (1)
Note that in the baseline calibration of the GS model, entrepreneurscon-
sumption and government spending are normalized to zero. Model simulations
conducted under the original BGG framework imply that these simplications
are reasonable.
Householdsconsumption is determined by a standard Euler equation sum-
marizing householdsoptimal consumption-savings allocation:
 ct =  Etct+1   Etzt+1 + it   Ett+1 (2)
zt, the growth of productivity, enters the Euler equation, as well as other
several equations in the model, because the levels of consumption, investment,
output, capital stock and net worth are normalized by the level of technology,
in order to make these real quantities stationary.
Households also make a decision on labor supply. Labor demand, on the
other hand, is derived from entrepreneurs prot maximization problem. In
an equilibrium, labor supply equals labor demand. Using the labor demand
condition to eliminate wages from the labor supply equation yields the following
labor-market equilibrium condition:
yt +mct   ct = (1 + )ht (3)
mct enters (3) because we use the denition of mct, mct = pw;t   pt, to
eliminate pw;t   pt, where pw;t is the wholesale price and pt is the price level of
the economy. (3) thus is the equation that denes mct in the system.
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On the production side, entrepreneurs have access to a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology:
yt = ht + (1  )kt   (1  )zt (4)
Capital kt is purchased by the entrepreneurs at the end of period t 1. The
expected real rate of return on capital, Etrkt+1; is given by:
Etr
k
t+1 =
mc(1  ) ykZ
mc(1  ) ykZ + (1  )
(Etyt+1   kt+1 + Etzt+1 + Etmct+1)
+
1  
mc(1  ) ykZ + (1  )
Etqt+1   qt (5)
Intuitively, the expected real rate of return on capital depends on the mar-
ginal prot from the production of wholesale goods, which (in log-linearized) is
given by:
mc(1  ) ykZ
mc(1  ) ykZ + (1  )
(Etpw;t+1   Etpt+1 + Etyt+1   kt+1)
Etyt+1   kt+1 is derived from log-linearizing the marginal product of cap-
ital. Substituting the real marginal cost (for the retailers), mct = pw;t  
pt; we derive the rst part of the right-hand side of (5). The second part,
1 
mc(1 ) ykZ+(1 )Etqt+1   qt; is the capital gain. Summing the marginal prot
and the capital gain, we derive at the real rate of return on capital.
To nance their capital expenditures, the entrepreneurs employ internal
funds, net worth, but also need to acquire loans from nancial intermediaries.
In the presence of credit-market frictions, the nancial intermediaries can ver-
ify the return on the entrepreneurial investment only through the payment of a
monitoring cost. The nancial intermediaries and the entrepreneurs design loan
contracts to minimize the expected agency cost. The nature of the contracts is
that the entrepreneurs need to pay a premium above the riskless rate, which in
this model is the opportunity cost for the nancial intermediaries. The external
nance premium in turn depends on the nancial position of the entrepreneurs.
In particular, the external nance premium increases when a smaller fraction of
the capital expenditures are nanced by the entrepreneursnet worth:
st =  (qt + kt+1   nt+1) (6)
In a competitive nancial market, the expected cost of borrowing is equated
to the expected return on capital:
Etr
k
t+1 = it   Ett+1 + st (7)
where it   Ett+1 is the (real) riskless rate.
The rest of the capital expenditures are nanced by entrepreneurial net
worth, which is determined by,
nt+1 =
k
n
rkt  

k
n
  1

Et 1rkt + nt   zt
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That is, the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs at the end of period t is
the sum of the net worth from the previous period, nt; and knr
k
t  
 
k
n   1

Et 1rkt ;
the operating prot of the entrepreneurs earned during period t. knr
k
t is the (log-
linearized) realized return on investment.
 
k
n   1

Et 1rkt is the (log-linearized)
entrepreneursmarginal cost of external funds that is predetermined in period
t by the nancial intermediaries. Using the denition of the external nance
premium, Et 1rkt = st 1 + it   Et 1t; we have:
nt+1 =
k
n
rkt  

k
n
  1

(st 1 + it   Et 1t) + nt   zt (8)
The entrepreneurs purchase capital from capital-producers who combine in-
vestment and depreciated capital stock. This activity entails physical adjust-
ment costs, with the corresponding CRS production. The aggregate capital
accumulation equation is thus given by:
kt+1 =
(1  )
Z
(kt   zt) +

1  1  
Z

invt (9)
Capital producers maximize prot subject to the adjustment cost, yielding
the following rst-order condition:
qt = k (invt   kt + zt) (10)
(10) can be interpreted as an equilibrium condition for the investment-good
market. That is, the demand for investment from entrepreneurs equals the
investment goods supplied by capital producers. This determines the price of
capital, which in this model, interpretable as asset prices. (10) implies that
investment increases as asset prices rise.
The retailers set price in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). This gives
rise to a standard Phillip curve:
t = mct + Ett+1 (11)
It is practical to use (11) to write the dynamics of net worth as:
nt+1 =
k
n
rkt  

k
n
  1

st 1 + it   t 1

+


mct 1

+ nt   zt (12)
The growth of productivity has both transitory and persistent components:
zt = dt + "t (13)
The persistent component follows an AR(1) process:
dt = pddt 1 + t (14)
where shocks to the transitory and persistent components are,
"t  i:i:d:N
 
0; 2"

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and
t  i:i:d:N
 
0; 2

Finally, since one of the central banks target variables is the output gap,
which is the deviation of output from its hypothetical level in the frictionless
economy, we also have the following set of equations dening the frictionless
economy,4
yt   ct = (1 + )ht (15)
yt = h

t + (1  )kt   (1  )zt (16)
yt =
c
y
ct +
inv
y
invt (17)
kt+1 =
1  
Z
(kt   zt) + (1 
1  
Z
)invt (18)
qt = k (inv

t   kt + zt) (19)
rt =
mc(1  ) ykZ
mc(1  ) ykZ + (1  )
 
Ety

t+1   kt+1 + Etzt+1

(20)
+
1  
mc(1  ) ykZ + (1  )
Etq

t+1   qt
 ct =  Etct+1   Etzt+1 + rt (21)byt = yt   yt (22)
Thus, I dene the frictionless variables conditional on the hypothetical level
of capital stock that exists when the economy has been under exible prices and
without credit-market frictions, as in Neiss and Nelson (2003). I also conducted
the analysis in this paper by dening the frictionless economy conditional on
the actual level of capital stock, as in Woodford (2003). All of the conclusions
in this paper remain valid under the Woodford approach. I follow Neiss and
Nelson because this approach allows me to illustrate my results in a particularly
sharp way.
For ease of presentation, write the model economy in the state-space format,
as in Svensson (2006):
Xt+1
Hxt+1jt

= A

Xt
xt

+Bit +

C
0

"t+1 (23)
4Like Gilchrist and Saito (2006), in the frictionless economy, there are no nominal rigidities
and credit-market frictions. The reason that I dene the frictionless economy as the ex-price
economy in the absence of credit-market frictions as opposed to in the presence of credit-market
frictions is because it can be argued that a goal of the central bank is to lead the economy as
close as possible to the distortion-freestate. In this model economy, credit-market frictions
are distortions in the form of asymmetric information in nancial markets that in turn gives
rise to uctuations in the external nance premium. As will be shown later, the central bank
can in fact stabilize the external nance premium. At the micro-level, unlike the distortions
arisen from monopolistic competition that are beyond central banksauthority to deal with,
most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are capable of dealing with the distortions
in nancial markets. As pointed out by Bernanke (2002), [T]he Fed has been entrusted with
the responsibility of helping to ensure the stability of the nancial system...by supporting such
objectives as more transparent accounting and disclosure practice and working to improve the
nancial literacy and competence of investors.
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where Xt is an nX -vector of predetermined variables, xt is an nx-vector of
non-predetermined variables, it is an ni-vector of instruments , and "t is an
n"-vector of exogenous zero-mean iid shocks. The matrices A; B; C; and H are
of dimension (nX + nx)  (nX + nx) ; (nX + nx)  ni; nX  n" and nx  nx;
respectively. For any vector zt; zt+1jt denotes the rational expectation Etzt+1:
It is practical to partition A and B conformably with Xt and xt;
A 

A11 A12
A21 A22

; B 

B1
B2

Under this format, the system includes nine predetermined variables, twenty
non-predetermined variables, two shocks and one instrument. Appendix A
includes the detail on how to present the GS model into the canonical format
(23).
3 Monetary policy
3.1 Policy rule to respond strongly to ination
I close the model by specifying how the central bank conducts its monetary
policy. According to conventional wisdom, an optimal strategy is for the central
bank to set the nominal interest rate to respond strongly to ination. In other
words, there is no further gain from responding to asset prices and other nancial
indicators beyond the extent to which they a¤ect the central banks forecast of
ination.
Such strategy can be modelled via a Taylor-type instrument rule, a common
practice since Taylor (1993). Under the nancial accelerator framework, several
authors suggest that an optimal strategy is for the central bank to adopt the
following Taylor-type instrument rule (thereafter BG base-case rule):5
it = 2t (24)
The coe¢ cient on ination of two is chosen (by the earlier literature) to
render determinacy and to ensure that the magnitude of monetary-policy tight-
ening is large enough to suppress inationary pressures.6 The idea is to create
a rise (fall) in the real interest rate in response to a positive (negative) shock to
the economy.
5See Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Gilchrist and Saito
(2006). In its original version, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), the expected ination,
Ett+1; is used in the rule, instead of t: Nonetheless, using t in fact leads to a better
macroeconomic outcome. The reason is, according to the Phillip curve (11), t = mct +
Ett+1: Thus, setting the nominal interest rate to respond to t is equivalent to responding
to Ett+1 as well as mct: mct depends on the output gap, and this causes the rule with t to
perform better than that with Ett+1 alone. Therefore, I focus on the rule that responds to
t, as in Gilchrist and Saito (2006). The stabilization performance of the rules that respond
to Ett+1 is available upon request.
6 In the analysis in this paper, I also choose the coe¢ cient optimally to minimize the
central bank loss function.
8
3.2 Optimal policy under commitment
As a benchmark for comparison, I examine macroeconomic outcomes generated
by optimal policy under commitment. That is, the central bank is mandated
with an intertemporal loss function in period 0 with the constant discount factor
 (0 <  < 1) and a relative weight on output-gap variability equal to  > 0;
E0
1X
t=0
(1  ) tLt (25)
where
Lt =
1
2
[2t + by2t ] (26)
To derive optimal policy under commitment, the central bank minimizes
(25), once-and-for-all in period t = 0; subject to (23) for t  0 and to given initial
predetermined variables. To be more specic, the monetary policy problem is
to minimize the following Lagrangian:
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
(1  )t
"
Lt + 
0
t (Hxt+1  A21Xt  A22xt  B2it)
+
0
t+1 (Xt+1  A11Xt  A12xt  B1it   C"t+1)
#
+
1  


0
0
 
X0  X0

(27)
where t+1 and t are vectors of nX and nx Lagrange multipliers of the upper
and lower blocks, respectively, of the canonical system (23). X0 is the given
initial predetermined variables. Appendix B provides an algorithm on how to
solve this problem using the recursive saddle-point method.
It should be noted that (26) is the metric adopted in the earlier literature
to evaluate the relative performance of Taylor-type instrument rules.7 It corre-
sponds to the idea that the goal of monetary policy is to minimize the volatility
of ination and the output gap. The earlier literature concludes that rule (24) is
optimal by comparing its performance measured by (26) with other Taylor-type
instrument rules.
Optimal policy under commitment, on the other hand, gives the rst-best
macroeconomic outcome that the central bank is capable of implementing under
the nancial accelerator economy.8 Thus, optimal policy under commitment
can provide a benchmark for comparison in evaluating the absolute performance
of rule (24).
4 Performance of benchmark monetary policy
rules
Table 3 compares macroeconomic outcomes of the BG base-case rule (24) with
those generated by optimal policy under commitment. It is evident that the
7To be more specic, most earlier papers set  to unity.
8This rst-best macroeconomic outcome can be implemented via ination forecast target-
ing. See Svensson and Woodford (2005).
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BG base-case rule is far from being optimal. Under the BG base-case rule,
ination and the output gap, which are the target variables in this case, are
relatively volatile. As a result, the loss, which is the overall performance of a
policy rule, is 0.2843 under rule (24), compared to 0.0085 under optimal policy
under commitment.
I also go beyond the earlier literature by choosing the coe¢ cient in the BG
base-case rule to minimize (25), instead of only using the ad-hoc coe¢ cient of
two. The macroeconomic outcomes of the optimized rules are shown in the
parentheses. The loss of the optimized rule is 0.2119, which is 26% lower than
the ad-hoc version. In any event, this is still far from being able to match the
rst-best outcome under optimal policy.9
The same implication can be drawn from gure 1, which compares the im-
pulse responses to an unexpected disturbance to productivity growth under the
BG base-case rule with those under optimal policy. The dashed lines are those
under the BG base-case rule. The solid lines are those under optimal policy.
As highlighted in the gure, when compared to optimal policy, the BG base-
case rule fails badly to stabilize the economy. In particularly, under the BG
base-case rule, the economy is subject to volatile boom-bust cycles. Following
an unexpected rise in productivity growth, there is a run-up in credit. This
leads to a surge in investment and thus asset prices, which in turn causes en-
trepreneurs to take on even more debt and to make more investment. This is
the reason why the economy overheats as output rises above its full employment
level and ination rises above its target.
Under optimal policy, on the other hand, the economy appears to be able
to escape from the vicious cycle of asset booms and busts. As a consequence,
optimal policy allows the central bank to successfully stabilize both ination
and the output gap.
4.1 Countercyclicality of net worth in the optimal equi-
librium
An important mechanism that allows optimal policy under commitment to per-
form exceptionally well is the fact that under the optimal equilibrium the evo-
lution of net worth is countercyclical, not procyclical as prescribed by the BG
base-case rule. Consider an experiment in which productivity growth rises un-
expectedly during period t. In the case that the central bank follows the BG
9 It should be noted that the optimized coe¢ cient is excessively large. This is an un-
satisfactory feature of the optimized Taylor-type instrument rules because they prescribe an
incredibly aggressive response of the interest-rate instrument to ination. In practice, ina-
tion numbers are available but often with measurement errors or possibilities to get revised
later. Committing to a rule with an excessively large feedback coe¢ cient makes it more likely
for the central bank to respond to a small measurement error by setting the interest-rate in-
strument into a wrong direction by large percentage points, a mistake that may easily send the
economy into a recession or an inationary spiral. And since the excessively large optimized
coe¢ cient does not materially improve the economic performance, I will focus on the ad-hoc
version of the rules. In any event, all the conclusions derived in this paper remain the same
whether I use the optimized version or the ad-hoc version.
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base-case rule, net worth will jump by the same magnitude as the rise in the
growth of productivity. The reason is that net worth depends on the di¤erence
between the return on capital realized during period t and the cost of borrowing.
The cost of borrowing in period t is actually locked in by the loan contract that
was determined in period t  1 and thus una¤ected by unexpected disturbances
or policy. Following the BG base-case rule, the central bank then adjusts the
interest-rate instrument which in the current period does not a¤ect the rational
expectations equilibrium of the non-predetermined variables, as shown in (36).
Thus, the unexpected rise in the growth of productivity leads to an increase
in the realized return on capital and a one-to-one rise in net worth. This is
evident from the impulse responses of net worth in gure 1, in which under rule
(24) net worth rises one-to-one immediately after the shock.
More intuitively, after the unexpected rise in productivity growth, entrepre-
neurs will realize that the same amount of resources can lead to more output.
That is, the return on their investment becomes higher. Thus, the entrepre-
neurs will be willing to put more of their own funds into the investment projects,
which will lower the probability that the entrepreneurs will default and thereby
leading to a decline in the external nance premium. This in turn leads to
a lower borrowing cost, and thereby a surge in investment. Asset prices then
rise, causing the external nance premium to decline further and thus reinforc-
ing the propagation mechanism. Hence, the nancial accelerator mechanism
works well in propagating and magnifying a seemingly small disturbance into a
sizable destabilizing force. This is the reason why the BG base-case rule fails
to contain the destabilizing e¤ect created in the nancial market from passing
through to the real sector.
Under optimal policy under commitment, on the other hand, net worth falls
by a modest amount. The countercyclicality of net worth is a key mechanism
that allows optimal policy under commitment to stabilize the economy in the
presence of credit-market frictions. This is because the modest fall in net worth
prevents the external nance premium from dropping sharply. Such a benign
uctuation in the external nance premium then allows optimal policy under
commitment to prevent disturbances in the nancial market from developing
into a volatile cycle of credit and asset booms and busts.
5 Alternative Taylor-type instrument rules
The analysis in the previous section suggests that it appears to be suboptimal
for the central bank to follow the BG base-case rule, a Taylor-type instrument
rule that has been used extensively in the literature. This raises a question on
the economic performance of other Taylor-type instrument rules, whether these
rules can deliver better economic outcomes or even match the rst-best outcome
under optimal policy. In other words, it is interesting to examine whether the
conclusions derived in the previous section are robust to di¤erent specications
of Taylor-type instrument rules.
The rst alternative Taylor-type instrument rule to be examined is the classic
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Taylor (1993) rule:
it = 1:5t + 0:5byt (28)
Thus, instead of setting the interest-rate instrument to respond to ination
only, rule (28) also prescribes the central bank to respond to uctuations in
the output gap. The idea is since the goal of the central bank is to stabilize
not only ination, but also the output gap, it makes more sense for the central
bank to respond to both target variables. The coe¢ cients of 1.5 and 0.5 are
chosen by Taylor (1993). Bernanke and Gertler (2001) suggest that the rule of
the same form with the coe¢ cients on ination of 3 and on the output gap of
unity appears to perform reasonably well under the nancial accelerator model
(thereafter, BG output-gap rule). Nonetheless, the rule in which the coe¢ cients
are chosen to minimize the central bank loss function will also be examined.
The second alternative Taylor-type instrument rule to be evaluated is the
classic Taylor with the one-period lagged nominal interest rate:
it = 1:5t + 0:5byt + 1:1it 1 (29)
The coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is 1.1, which is greater than unity.
This feature is what Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) call superinertia, which
has been reported by several, including Levin and Williams (2003), to allow
Taylor-type instrument rules to perform reasonably well across several bench-
mark macroeconomic models. A variant of the Taylor rule with interest-rate
smoothing is also examined in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)
it = 0:9it 1 + (1  0:9)1:1t
in which, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate to respond only to
ination and the one-period lagged interest rate, and not to the output gap
(thereafter, GL interest-rate smoothing rule).10
The next rule produces the best macroeconomic performance among all the
Taylor-type instrument rules examined in Gilchrist and Saito (2006) (thereafter,
GS rule):
it = r

t + 2t + 0:1(qt   qt )
That is, under the GS rule, the central bank sets the interest-rate instrument
to respond, not only to ination, but also to the natural interest rate as well as
the asset-price gap.
Finally, the analysis in the previous section suggests that net worth may
play a key role on the transmission mechanism. Therefore, consider including
net worth into the rule as follows:
it = 2t + 0:37nt
This rule, which prescribes the central bank to respond to net worth as well
as ination, is examined in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) [thereafter, net worth
rule].
10Note again that in the original version in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), the expected ination
Ett+1 is included in the rule, instead of ination. But responding to ination in fact leads
to a lower loss than responding to the expected ination due to the same reason as described
in the case of the BG base-case rule.
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5.1 The performance of alternative Taylor-type instru-
ment rules
Table 4 presents macroeconomic outcomes of the alternative Taylor-type instru-
ment rules. It is evident that all the alternative Taylor rules, either the ad-hoc
version or the optimized version, are from being optimal. The best performer
among the alternative Taylor rules is the GS rule, which results in a loss of
0.2212, still far from being able to replicate the rst-best outcome generated
under optimal policy.11
The results here suggest that not only the BG base-case rule, but also all the
standard Taylor-type instrument rules that are commonly used in the literature
fail to stabilize the economy in the presence of credit and asset booms and busts.
In such an environment, it may not be an optimal strategy for the central bank
to mechanically set interest rates to respond to some economic factors, according
to Taylor-type instrument rules.
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses of net worth to an unexpected rise
in productivity growth. The solid lines are those under the alternative Taylor
rules. The dashed lines are those under optimal policy. It is clear from the
gure that net worth is procyclical under all the Taylor-type instrument rules
considered while under the optimal equilibrium net worth is countercyclical. As
suggested earlier, this is the reason underlying the inability of Taylor rules to
stabilize the economy. In particular, following the rise in productivity growth,
the increase in net worth causes the external nance premium to decline. This
induces entrepreneurs to increase their borrowing and to make more investment,
which in turn causes asset prices to rise. Net worth thus rises even further.
This is the propagating mechanism underlying the nancial accelerator that
turns out to work well in magnifying small, initial disturbances into volatile
credit and asset booms and busts.
6 Empirical evidence on countercyclicality of net
worth
Several studies provide evidence on a shift in the monetary policy regime at the
onset of the Volcker chairmanship of the FOMC. Along with the regime switch
is an empirical fact that the volatility of the US economy has declined sharply
since the mid-1980s.12
Table 5 reports the correlation between productivity and the real value (CPI-
adjusted) of all shares listed in the NYSE during the pre-Volcker era (1954-1979)
11 I also evaluate a set of 96 Taylor rules, using almost every reasonable combination of
economic variables in the rules and optimized coe¢ cients. Several of them, however, present
unconventional monetary policy strategy of responding to combinations of economic variables
that are unusual in policy debates and not often used in the literature. In any event, no rules
come close to match the rst-best outcome under optimal policy. Therefore, I will focus on
the rules presented in the previous subsection, which are regularly used by researchers and
can be related to real-world policymaking.
12See for instance Stock and Watson (2002) and Gail, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003).
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and since the Volcker chairmanship of the FOMC (1979-2007). The real value of
all shared listed in the NYSE is a proxy for net worth in the nancial accelerator
economy. Both variables are HP-detrended.
It is evident from the table that prior to 1979Q3, a commonly determined
monetary policy break date, net worth is positively correlated with productivity.
After 1979Q3, on the other hand, the correlation between productivity and net
worth is mildly negative. As noted in gure 2, such a negative correlation
between productivity and net worth is a salient feature of the economic behaviors
under optimal policy. In this sense, the analysis in this paper suggests that the
monetary policy regime since the Volcker chairmanship is close to optimal and
might be characterized as optimal policy under commitment.
It should be noted that the same conclusion is still valid when 1984Q1 is used
as the breakdate instead. 1984Q1 is identied by many authors as a breakpoint
in output growth volatility.13
7 Engineering a countercyclicality in net worth
As noted earlier, net worth is countercyclical under the optimal equilibrium.
The countercyclicality of net worth is a key mechanism that allows the central
bank to avoid credit and asset booms and busts and thus to stabilize ination
and the output gap simultaneously and instantaneously. The question is why
net worth is countercyclical under the optimal equilibrium.
7.1 Making a credible commitment as a stabilization in-
strument
In order to understand the key mechanism that allows the central bank to create
a countercyclicality in net worth, it is useful to re-examine the possible policy
options that the central bank can use to stabilize the economy. Apparently,
in real-world monetary policymaking, the central bank does not solely rely on
short-term nominal interest rates as its instrument. For instance, as highlighted
in gure 3, the federal funds rate, the benchmark policy rate of the Federal
Reserve, has been kept constant at 5.25 percent since June 29, 2006. However,
during this time span, economic conditions have been continuously changing, as
shown in table 6. Does this imply that during this period, the Fed failed to take
action, or did not attempt to ne tune the economy into the right direction?
It is true that the FOMC has not adjust the federal funds rate since June
29, 2006. Nonetheless, adjusting the federal funds rate is not the only channel
that the Fed can inuence the economy. One method that the FOMC has
been used nowadays to inuence the economy is to provide guidance or its
view on the direction of the economy and its tentative stance on near-future
monetary policy in the statements following each FOMC meeting.14 During
13See for example Leduc and Sill (2006).
14For instance, amid sharp economic slowdown and concerns over the mortgage market, on
March 21, 2007, the FOMC signalled its shift from the tightening bias to a neutral bias
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the in-between-meeting period, the Fed can also inuence the direction of the
economy through public pronouncements and testimony by Fed governors and
Reserve Bank presidents.
To understand the intellectual underpinning of such practice and how these
central bankerstalkscan a¤ect the economy, consider iterating (11) forward
to obtain:
t = Et
1X
i=0
i [mct+i]
where mct+i is the real marginal cost, which is a proxy for the excess demand.
It can be shown that mct+i depends on the gap between the real interest rate
and the natural interest rate, it+i   Et+it+1+i   rt+i, a measure of monetary
policy stance. Thus, ination depends not only on the current monetary-policy
stance, but also on private agentsexpectations on the Feds future action. In
this way, the Fed can lower ination, by making a commitment, or a promise, to
get tough on ination going forward. If the Feds commitment is credible, the
expectations on the real marginal cost will be stabilized and the Fed can lower
ination without having to adjust the federal funds rate in the current period.
This is precisely what happens in the optimal equilibrium generated by op-
timal policy under commitment. Under optimal policy under commitment,
the central bank does not solely rely on adjusting the nominal interest rate to
stabilize the economy. This is highlighted in the last panel of gure 1 which
compares the paths of the nominal interest rate under optimal policy and the
BG base-case rule. Notice that although optimal policy under commitment can
successfully stabilize ination, optimal policy under commitment requires the
central bank to raise the nominal interest rate much less than that prescribed by
the BG base-case rule. The reason that optimal policy under commitment can
stabilize ination without having to aggressively raise the nominal interest rate
is because under optimal policy the central bank makes a credible commitment
that it will get tough on ination in the future.
To be more specic, in our framework, the commitment terms correspond to

0
t 1H in the dual loss function (33), shown in Appendix B.
15 According to the
way that the model economy is arranged into the canonical system as in (30)
and (31) in Appendix A, it can be shown that the central banks commitment
by dropping a reference to additional rminglanguage that it had used since June 29, 2006,
despite keeping the federal funds rate constant at 5.25 percent.
15To make it easier to see intuitively, consider a simple case, without a loss of generality,
that xt, the non-predetermined variable, consists of only t: 
0
t 1H was determined from the
previous period. If 
0
t 1H > 0; this will induce the central bank to implement t < 0 in order
to minimize eLt (on the other hand, 0t 1H < 0 will induce the central bank to deliver t > 0):
That is, 
0
t 1H > 0, which again was determined in the previous period, is a commitment
made by the central bank in the past that constrains the central banks action in the current
period, to deliver t < 0: In the case that xt consists of more than one variables, we simply
have to rearrange terms in 
0
t 1H for each non-predetermined variable to get each variables
commitment term.
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on its policy stance towards future ination is:
1

1 +
1

9 + 3
where 1; 9 and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers on the non-predetermined
equations, in the order shown in (31).
Figure 4 displays the impulse response of the central banks commitment
on its policy stance on ination following an unexpected rise in productivity
growth.16 Thus, under optimal policy, the central bank makes a strong com-
mitment that it will get toughon ination, especially after period 37 onward.
This strong commitment to ght ination even after productivity growth has
returned to the trend allows the central bank to stabilize inationary expec-
tations and thus ination in the current period, without having to excessively
adjust the nominal interest rate.
7.2 Optimal policy responses amid credit and asset booms
and busts
Figure 5 presents the impulse response of the central banks commitment on its
policy stance towards the return on capital, rkt : The gure suggests that under
optimal policy under commitment, the central bank responds to the unexpected
rise in productivity growth by making a commitment to keep the rate of return
on capital below the trend going forward. This is the reason why in the optimal
equilibrium, net worth is countercyclical and the economy can avoid a volatile
cycle of credit and asset booms and busts.
Intuitively, consider rst the scenario in which the central bank follows a
Taylor-type instrument rule. Following an unexpected rise in productivity
growth and thus the beginning of the boom phase, the central bank will re-
spond by mechanically raising the nominal interest rate. This will raise the
borrowing costs. But as highlighted in the last panel of gure 1, this is only
one-time tightening to respond to this surge in productivity growth. As soon
as productivity growth returns to the trend, the central bank will lower interest
rates as prescribed by the Taylor-type rule. Meanwhile, the rise in productiv-
ity growth above the trend implies that entrepreneurs can utilize their resources
more e¢ ciently going forward. Thus, without a rm commitment from the cen-
tral bank to maintain the tightening stance after productivity growth returns
to its trend, entrepreneurs can expect an unusually high rate of return on their
investment. This is why under Taylor rules, entrepreneurs put more of their
own funds into the investment projects at the beginning of the boom phase,
which causes net worth to rise sharply above the trend, as shown in gure 2.
The external nance premium then falls, causing investment and asset prices
to rise. Once it becomes clear that the excessive surge in productivity growth
is unsustainable and productivity growth returns to its trend, asset prices and
16A positive (negative) number means that the central bank promises to create an ination
rate higher (lower) than if it did not make the promise.
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investment thus fall sharply. Therefore, following Taylor rules, such as the BG
base-case rule, the central bank fails to prevent asset booms and busts, which in
turn lead to the poor stabilization performance of Taylor rules, as highlighted
in tables 3 and 4.
Optimal policy under commitment, on the other hand, allows the central
bank to avoid the volatile credit and asset booms and busts. The reason
is under optimal policy under commitment, the central bank responds to the
unexpected rise in productivity growth by making a credible commitment to
keep the rate of return on capital below the trend, as shown in gure 5. If the
commitment is credible, the return on capital will be expected to remain below
the trend. The entrepreneurs thus will be discouraged to put their own funds
into the investment projects, which in turn causes net worth to fall modestly
below the trend, as shown in gure 2. The external nance premium will then
be stabilized and this is why under optimal policy, the central bank can kill o¤
the distortions in the nancial markets before they can develop into credit and
asset booms and busts.
8 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal policy responses amid credit and asset booms and
busts. Conventional wisdom is for the central bank to respond to asset prices
and other nancial indicators only insofar as these factors signal future changes
in ination. In particular, several studies conclude that it is optimal for the
central bank to follow a Taylor-type instrument rule that responds strongly to
ination. Nonetheless, the present paper nds that such a strategy is far from
being optimal.
The discrepancy is due to the fact that the earlier papers evaluate the strat-
egy by comparing its performance with a restricted set of Taylor rules. Given
that the performance of the Taylor rules in the comparison group is mediocre,
the performance of the strategy to respond strongly to ination appears to be
impressive.
The present paper, on the other hand, compares the performance of the
strategy to respond strongly to ination, and its variants in the Taylor family,
with optimal policy under commitment. The optimal equilibrium generated
by optimal policy under commitment is the rst-best macroeconomic outcome
that the central bank is capable of implementing. Thus, it can be argued that
optimal policy under commitment serves as a more appropriate benchmark for
policy evaluation.
Using optimal policy under commitment as a benchmark allows the present
paper to discover that the monetary policy strategy of responding strongly to
ination and its variants in the Taylor family fail badly to stabilize the econ-
omy. Following an unexpected rise in productivity growth, the central bank
is unsuccessful in averting a volatile cycle of asset booms and busts and thus
unable to maintain price stability and full-employment output. Optimal policy
under commitment, on the other hand, can successfully stabilize both ination
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and the output gap while avoiding the vicious cycle of credit and asset booms
and busts.
In subsequent research, I hope to consider several extensions to the work so
far:
First, it would be interesting to apply the analysis to a model economy with
richer dynamics. The GS model can be extended by including a larger set of
structural shocks and adding structure to enhance dynamic propagation.17 The
model then can be estimated using the Bayesian techniques. This may allow
the stochastic simulations generated by the model to be more consistent with
data.
Second, in the present paper, the interpretation of optimal monetary policy
is that the central bank operates under the regime of ination targeting [See
Svensson and Woodford (2005)]. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the
central bank optimizing welfare. That is, the central banks loss function can
be derived from taking a Taylor approximation to households utility, as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). It is interesting to learn which variables the
central bank should target, in the presence of credit-market frictions.
Third, the analysis in this paper is based on the linear-quadratic para-
digm in which the model economy is log-linearized and the objective function is
quadratic.18 An alternative method is that of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
in which the rst order condition with respect to the original, non-linearized
model economy is derived and the rst order condition, along with the model
economy, is then linearized.19
Finally, under the commitment equilibrium, it is assumed that the central
bank can make a credible promise that will constrain its action in the future.
An important topic for future research is how to implement the commitment
equilibrium. In other words, how can we design a mechanism that induces the
central bank to deliver its own promise made from the past and thereby makes
its promise credible to private agents?
17For instance, AR(1) exogenous disturbances to net worth and the external nance pre-
mium in the spirit of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2005) can be included.
18The problem with this approach, which will become relevant when we use the Rotemberg
and Woodford approximation to derive the central bank loss function, is that the welfare
approximation is only valid if the steady state is undistorted. Nonetheless, in the presence of
monopolistic competition, the steady state is distorted, unless some unrealistic, ad-hoc gov-
ernment subsidies are assumed. Kim and Kim (2003) show that approximations to distorted
models can be signicantly inaccurate such that welfare conclusions derived are completely
counterintuitive.
19 I have followed this approach but the preliminary analysis is that there is no solution to the
resulting system of linearized rst-order conditions and the model economy. This is because
the number of non-predetermined variables is greater than that of unstable eigenvalues.
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A Presenting the GS model into the state-space
format
The GS model (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14)
and (15)-(22) can be presented in the canonical system (23), by dening the
following sets of predetermined and non-predetermined variables,
Xt = fkt; st 1; nt; t 1; "t; dt; kt ; it 1;mct 1g (30)
xt =

ct; zt; t; r
k
t ; yt;mct; qt; invt; st; ht; kt+1; nt+1;byt; yt ; ht ;
ct ; k

t+1; inv

t ; q

t ; r

t

(31)
The elements of the corresponding matrices A; B and C are available upon
request.
Note that the key to make the analysis of optimal policy in this paper work
is to dene kt+1 and nt+1 as non-predetermined variables. This classication
however is not out of ordinary. Remind you that under the GS model, kt+1 and
nt+1 are in fact determined in period t: When one solves a rational expectations
model on dynare or gensys, a convention in these programs is that variables
dated t are always known at t: Thus, to assemble the model into these programs,
one needs to write kt+1 and nt+1 as kt and nt; or treat kt+1 and nt+1 in the
same way as all other variables dated t:
B Solving optimal policy under commitment
Notice that problem (27) is not recursive, because non-predetermined variables,
xt; depend on expected future non-predetermined variables Hxt+1: Thus, the
practical dynamic-programming method cannot be used directly.
Nonetheless, as pointed out in Svensson (2006), this problem can be solved
using the recursive saddle-point method of Marcet and Marimon (1999) by in-
troducing a ctitious vector of Lagrange multipliers,  1; equal to zero,
 1 = 0 (32)
Then, the discounted sum of the upper term in the Lagrangian can be writ-
ten:
E0
1X
t=0
(1  )t
h
Lt + 
0
t (Hxt+1  A21Xt  A22xt  B2it)
i
=
1X
t=0
(1  )t

Lt + 
0
t ( A21Xt  A22xt  B2it) +
1


0
t 1Hxt

It follows that the loss function (26) can be rewritten in terms of the dual
period loss:
eLt  Lt + 0t ( A21Xt  A22xt  B2xt) + 10t 1Hxt (33)
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where t 1 is a new predetermined variable in period t and t is introduced as
a new control. t 1 and t are related by the dynamic equation,
t = t (34)
The optimal policy under commitment problem can then be reformulated as
the recursive dual saddle-point problem:
max
ftgt0
min
fxt;itgt0
E0
1X
t=0
(1  )teLt
subject to (34) and,
Xt+1 = A11Xt +A12xt +B1it + C"t+1 (35)
Notice that the recursive dual saddle-point problem is recursive where fxt; it; tg
are controls and

Xt;t 1
	
are predetermined. Here, we can use the standard
solution for the Linear Quadratic Regulator(LQR) problem. The solution is in
the form of the policy function of the control variables and the evolution of the
predetermined variables24 xtit
t
35 = F  Xt
t 1

(36)

Xt+1
t

= M

Xt
t 1

+

C
0

"t+1 (37)
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Table 1: Summary of the model variables
Variable Explanation
ct consumption
zt productivity growth
it nominal interest rate
t ination
rkt real rate of return on capital
yt output
kt+1 capital at the end of period t
mct real marginal cost
qt price of capital
st external nance premium
nt+1 net worth at the end of period t
invt investment
ht labor supply
"t transitory shock to productivity
dt persistent component of productivity
t persistent shock to productivitybyt output gap
rt natural interest rate
Table 2: Baseline calibration of the model parameters and the steady-state level
of some key variables
Parameter Explanation Baseline calibration
 discount factor 0.984
 labor share 2/3
 inverse of labor supply elasticity 0.8
 depreciation rate 0.025
k elasticity of asset prices 0.25
"=("  1) steady-state markup 1.1
 Calvo parameter 0.75
k=n  1 steady-state leverage ratio 0.8
 elasticity of the nance premium 0.05
 mean technology growth rate 0.00427
" standard deviation of the transitory shock 0.01100
 standard deviation of the persistent shock 0.001100
d AR(1) coe¢ cient of the persistent shock 0.95
Table 3: Macroeconomic performance of the BG base-case rule and optimal
policy under commitment
Rule Loss var(t) var(byt) var(it   it 1)
BG base-case 0.2843 0.0549 0.5137 0.0138
(0.2238) (6.55E-12) (0.4476) (0.0035)
Optimal policy 0.0085 0.0012 0.0158 0.0024
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Table 4: Macroeconomic performance of the alternative Taylor-type instrument
rules
Rule Loss var(t) var(byt) var(it   it 1)
Optimal policy 0.0085 0.0012 0.0158 0.0138
Classic Taylor 0.2948 0.1391 0.4505 0.0105
(0.2160) (0.0072) (0.4248) (0.0030)
BG output-gap rule 0.2444 0.0603 0.4284 0.0043
Superinertia 0.2249 0.0453 0.4045 0.0009
(0.2021) (0.0434) (0.3607) (1.48E-05)
GL interest-rate smoothing 1.9784 0.7916 3.1651 0.0072
(0.2165) (0.0133) (0.4197) (3.09E-04)
GS rule 0.2212 0.0009 0.4416 0.3799
(0.2030) (0.0354) (0.3705) (0.3899)
Net worth rule 0.3175 0.0359 0.5990 0.3442
(0.2214) (8.54E-05) (0.4427) (0.0075)
Table 5: The correlation between productivity and net worth
Period Correlation
1954Q1-1979Q2 0.3782
1954Q1-1983Q4 0.3075
1979Q3-2007Q1 -0.0655
1984Q1-2007Q1 -0.0804
Source: DataStream and the authors calculation
Table 6: Selected US economic indicators, 2006Q1-2007Q2
Economic indicator 2006 2007
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
GDP growth (p.a. %) 5.6 2.6 2.0 2.5 0.6 na
CPI (YoY %) 3.6 4.0 3.3 1.9 2.4 2.6
TIPS-based expected ination (p.a. %) 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.3 na
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to an unexpected rise in productivity growth under
the BG base-case rule and optimal policy
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Figure 2: The impulse responses of net worth under alternative Taylor-type
instrument rules
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Figure 3: US federal funds target rate
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Figure 4: Central banks commitment on ghting ination following an unex-
pected rise in productivity growth
Source: The central bank's commitment on its policy stance towards inflation
following an unexpected rise in productivity growth.  The positive (negative) numbers imply
that the central bank has promised to create inflation in that period higher (lower) than
if it did not make the promise.
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Figure 5: Central banks commitment on its policy stance toward the rate of
return on capital
Note: The central bank's commitment on its policy stance towards the return on capital
following an unexpected rise in productivity growth.  The positive (negative) numbers imply
that the central bank has promised to keep the return on capital in that period above (below)
the trend.
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97
28
